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At first reading, the law of arrest in Pennsylvania seems com-
pletely straightforward, logical, and historically familiar. The Rules
of Criminal Procedure' seem to indicate clearly when arrests can be
made and when warrants are required. The common law of arrest
based on the classification of an offense as either a felony or a misde-
meanor is carried forward and articulated in the rules. Further, the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code,2 which had the Model Penal Code8 as its
principal progenitor, employs the conventional classification of of-
fenses as felonies or misdemeanors as a central feature of its struc-
ture. Because of the very traditional appearance of the law in this
area, it would be fair to assume that most of the significant issues
regarding arrest matters had been adequately addressed.
But while the law of arrest in Pennsylvania looks quite familiar,
in fact, the surface appearance is very misleading. Indeed, the sur-
face structure is itself something of a mirage. What one thinks one
sees turns out, in reality, not to be there. Moreover, there exists an
entirely subterranean world of the law of arrest in Pennsylvania that
one gets only the slightest hint of in the primary law. Examples will
best illustrate this by testing your knowledge and maybe even your
common sense about the operation of the rules. Consider these two
fact situations:
Case Number One.-At 8:00 p.m. on a busy city street, a pedes-
trian is struck by an automobile. While sixteen witnesses watch, the
driver of the car momentarily stops, looks back at the pedestrian now
lying in the street, and then rapidly drives away. Within ten seconds,
a police officer arrives on the scene, observes the person lying in the
street, hears the statements of the sixteen bystanders, and obtains
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
I. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1-9998.
2. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101-9183 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL
CODE].
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the same license plate number and description of the vehicle involved
from all sixteen people. The officer relays by radio the information
that he has observed and obtained. Fortuitously, at the time this first
officer's broadcast is made another police car is in traffic behind the
described vehicle at a place very close to the scene of the incident.
The total elapsed time from the striking of the pedestrian to locating
the car that was involved was no more than five minutes. Can the
driver of the car be arrested?
Case Number Two.-A small municipality that is deeply con-
cerned about the aesthetic appearance of its community has passed
an ordinance requiring homeowners to mow their lawns. The ordi-
nance prohibits homeowners from allowing the grass in their lawns
to grow to a length of more than five inches and imposes a five dollar
penalty. A police officer of the municipality sees homeowner Jones
(who is known personally to the officer) standing on the sidewalk in
front of his (Jones') house. The officer, while on the sidewalk him-
self, with his handy ruler, measures Jones' grass and determines that
it is seven inches tall. Can he arrest Jones?
If you learned that the police officer in case number one proba-
bly could not arrest the "hit and run" driver, would you be sur-
prised? If you learned that the police officer in case number two
might very well be authorized to arrest Jones, would that surprise
you? If you are not surprised, then you need to read no further. If,
however, you are surprised by these answers, then perhaps a narrow
article on the law of warrantless arrests by police officers will have
some value.
II. Pennsylvania Adopts (Sort of) the Common Law
A. The Common Law Rules of Arrest in Pennsylvania
The law of arrest in Pennsylvania seems susceptible to a suc-
cinct and forthright set of rules. Like the common law from which it
was derived,4 present Pennsylvania law authorizes an arrest for any
offense when a warrant has been issued. 5 In addition, there are a
variety of situations in which an arrest can properly be made without
a warrant. The starting point for this authorization is Rule 101 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
4. See Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant, 22 MIcH. L. REV. 541 (1924) [hereinafter Wil-
gus]; Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 448 (1930); Note,
Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1183 (1952); see also
McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881).
5. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 101, 102, 119-124.
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Criminal proceedings in court cases shall be instituted by:
2. an arrest without a warrant when the offense is a felony
or a misdemeanor committed in the presence of the police officer
making the arrest; or
3. an arrest without a warrant upon probable cause when
the offense is a felony; or
4. an arrest without a warrant upon probable cause when
the offense is a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of
the police officer making the arrest, when such arrest without a
warrant is specifically authorized by statute.6
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 101 are the simple restatements of the
common law rules of warrantless arrest.7 As these subsections indi-
cate, the validity of a warrantless arrest under the rule will turn on
the categorization of the offense as either a misdemeanor or a felony.
To restate the rule for purposes of emphasis, a warrantless arrest is
totally authorized for felonies, regardless of whether it was commit-
ted in the officer's presence, whenever the officer has probable cause
to believe a felony has been committed because of information re-
ceived from some other source or because he has personally wit-
nessed it. However, no warrantless arrest is authorized for a misde-
meanor not committed in his presence, regardless of how good the
probable cause is unless there is separate legal authorization for such
an arrest to come within section 4 of Rule 101.8
The restatement of the common law rules of warrantless arrests
in sections 2 and 3 of Rule 101 hardly seems remarkable. Indeed,
precisely because they are only reiterations of centuries-old common
law rules, it is hard to imagine any difficulties arising from them.
Apparently there are no fourth amendment problems associated with
these rules since the Court in United States v. Watson9 held that
warrantless arrests for felonies are constitutionally permissible. At
6. PA. R. CRIM. P. 101.
7. See McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881); see also Wilgus, supra note 4, at 567-
73.
8. Special legislative authorizations for warrantless arrests in cases of non-felonies, not
committed in a police officer's presence, have been made in several instances. Discussion of
these will be postponed until later, however, since they have unique, difficult, and indeed,
troubling problems of their own which require a separate treatment. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 47-48.
9. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Watson upholds the validity of a warrantless felony arrest
under the fourth amendment. Watson does not address warrantless misdemeanor arrests, but
the way the Court discussed the common law rules of arrest suggests that the Court would also
find warrantless arrests made for misdemeanors committed in the officer's presence to be con-
stitutional. See infra text accompanying note 61; see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963).
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least that seems to be true when the arrest is made in a public place
so as not to run afoul of Payton v. New York. This Article, how-
ever, will indicate that very real problems exist with warrantless ar-
rests made in public places under present day Pennsylvania law.
B. The Felony/Misdemeanor Distinction
To the extent that the common law and the Pennsylvania rules
of warrantless arrests turn on the distinction between whether the
offense is a felony or a misdemeanor, it might be helpful to have
some understanding of what those terms mean."1 Indeed, with some
background information concerning the term "felony," a beginning
can be made of a portrayal of some of the issues that exist in Penn-
sylvania today.
Blackstone provided the basic description of the term: "Felony,
in the general acceptation of our English law, comprises every spe-
cies of crime which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands
and goods."'12 These crimes included: felonious homicide (murder
and manslaughter), mayhem, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny,
prison breach (only for a while), rescue of a felon, and sodomy (ar-
guably)." Today, of course, felonies are not defined with respect to
the potential forfeiture of lands or goods. The punishment that can
be imposed, however, is still one of the central motivations for classi-
fying offenses as either felonies or misdemeanors. One textbook sur-
veying the modern definitions of felony in the United States indicates
that generally the term applies to "any crime punishable by death or
imprisonment for more than one year (or occasionally, for one year
or more) ...and that any other crime is a misdemeanor. 11 4 Simi-
larly, the Model Penal Code states: "A crime is a felony if it is so
designated in this Code or if a person convicted thereof may be sen-
10. 445 U.S. 573 (1980); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
II. Unfortunately, it will not be as helpful as one might think. In Pennsylvania, there
have been no statutory or case law definitions of the term "felony." Pennsylvania courts have,
on a number of occasions defined the term "misdemeanor," but these cases always arose in the
form of whether the acts of the defendant amounted to an offense under the law at a time
when the state still had common law crimes. The question was whether the acts amounted to a
misdemeanor or no crime at all. They did not discuss the distinction between a felony and a
misdemeanor. See Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881); Commonwealth v. Mochan,
177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955); Commonwealth v. Orris, 136 Pa. Super. 137, 7
A.2d 88 (1939); Commonwealth v. Miller, 94 Pa. Super. 499 (1928).
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "152.
13. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 14 (1982). Treason was in a separate
category from felony but had almost all of the same consequences as a felony. Id. The reason
that sodomy is only arguably a common law felony is that it was made an offense by a statute,
but it is said that the statute is old enough to be part of the common law. Id. at 14-15.
14. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1986).
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tenced [to death or] to imprisonment for a term which, apart from
an extended term, is in excess of one year."1
Under these definitions, it is clear that a legislature can declare
which crimes are felonies and which are not since they have the
power to fix the penalties for offenses. In some states, this is done in
a way that conforms with the Model Penal Code automatic assign-
ment of the class of the offense depending upon the punishment pre-
scribed.1 Other states classify each separate offense within its own
definition. Consequently, either by specifically declaring an offense
to be a felony or by assigning a potential penalty in excess of the
established dividing line between a felony and a misdemeanor, the
state legislatures ostensibly have the power to control the validity of
a warrantless arrest.
There are serious problems lurking here. Can a legislature de-
clare relatively minor offenses to be felonies and thereby enable war-
rantless arrests? This question was raised by Justice Marshall's dis-
sent in United States v. Watson:
[B]y paying no attention whatever to the substance of the
offense, and considering only whether it is labelled "felony," the
Court, in the guise of "constitutionalizing" the common-law
rule, actually does away with it altogether, replacing it with the
rule that the police may, consistent with the Constitution, arrest
on probable cause anyone who they believe has committed any
sort of crime at all. Certainly this rule would follow if the legis-
latures redenominated all crimes as "felonies." As a matter of
substance, it would seem to follow in any event from the holding
of this case, for the Court surely does not intend to accord con-
stitutional status to a distinction that can be readily changed by
legislative fiat. 18
What are the limits on the legislative power to declare an of-
fense a felony? Clearly, "felony" is not a term of art that applies
only to the common law crimes that were felonies. First, the argu-
ment for inclusion of the statutory offense of sodomy as a common
law felony was that the statute is old enough to be considered part of
15. MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 3, § 1.04(2).
16. See supra text accompanying note 15. See also discussion in the revised comments,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04 (Proposed Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). The
Model Penal Code also designates each offense that it establishes with a classification.
17. This was the Pennsylvania scheme prior to adoption of the Crimes Code. See JOINT
STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 107 com-
ment (1967).
18. 423 U.S. 411, 454 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the common law.19 This patently indicates the historical power of
legislative creation of felonies. Second, and perhaps most important,
the Watson case,20 at a minimum, stands for the proposition that
authorization, through classification of offenses, of warrantless ar-
rests for some non-common-law felonies is constitutionally within the
legislature's power. The offense for which Watson was arrested, pos-
session of stolen mail,2 was obviously not one of the common law
felonies.
All of this suggests that very real problems exist with the poten-
tial legislative ascription of the term "felony" to minor offenses. In
Pennsylvania, however, just the opposite problem seems to be the
case because the legislature has restricted the term "felony" to a
strikingly limited number of offenses.
In 1972, Pennsylvania enacted a new crimes code which consoli-
dated most principles of criminal liability and many crimes and de-
fenses into one title of the Pennsylvania statutes.2 Although there
have been changes to this code since then, the 1972 Code is still the
basis of the present day Pennsylvania Crimes Code. The 1972 Code
derived from a "Proposed Crimes Code for Pennsylvania" (hereinaf-
ter the "Draft Code"), which was prepared by the Joint State Gov-
ernment Commission and published in 1967.23 The Draft Code, in
turn, is taken extensively (indeed, just short of entirely) from the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. Like the Model Pe-
nal Code,25 the Draft Code26 and the 1972 Crimes Code27 provided
classifications of offenses. Several classes were established: murder in
the first and second degree, three degrees of felonies, three degrees
of misdemeanors, and summary offenses. 8 Essentially, this was in
complete accord with the pattern established by the Model Penal
Code.
But then Pennsylvania did something quite different. It substan-
tially altered the penalties ascribed to the classes of crimes.2 9 One
effect of this was to permit a wider range of sanctions for offenses
19. See supra note 13.
20. .423 U.S. 411 (1976).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982).
22. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101-9183 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
23. JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVA-
NIA (1967) [hereinafter DRAFT CODE].
24. Id. at vii.
25. MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 3, § 1.04.
26. DRAFT CODE supra note 23, § 107.
27. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106 (1982).
28. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b) and (c) (1982).
29. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 106, 1103-05 (1982).
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than was available in the Model Penal Code.8 0 As a free-standing
scheme of sentencing, it has much to commend it.31 A collateral con-
sequence of this basic structure, however, was the designation as
misdemeanors of many offenses that would be felonies under the
laws of almost every other state and the Model Penal Code. Thus,
while under the Model Penal Code the dividing line between misde-
meanors and felonies was imprisonment for more than one year,
32
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code set up the following schedule:33
Class of Offense Maximum (i.e. Potential) Sentence
Felony First Degree 20 Years
Felony Second Degree 10 Years
Felony Third Degree 7 Years
Misdemeanor First Degree 5 Years
Misdemeanor Second Degree 2 Years
Misdemeanor Third Degree 1 Year
Summary Offenses 90 Days
As a result, the implicit definition of a felony in Pennsylvania is
an offense that is punishable by a potential term of imprisonment of
more than five years. 4 This classification makes many offenses mis-
demeanors with quite substantial punishments. This, in turn, has a
significant collateral consequence in the area of the law of arrest.
While it is far from clear why Pennsylvania chose to alter the Model
Penal Code's classification of crimes, it appears that very little con-
sideration, if any, was given by the drafting committee"6 of the Pro-
30. The Model Penal Code established three grades of felonies in § 6.01. But the crimes
that Pennsylvania graded as misdemeanors would have come within the felony grade of the
Model Penal Code. See discussion infra note 33 and accompanying text.
31. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1103, 1104 (1982) with MODEL PENAL CODE supra
note 3, § 601.
32. MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 3, § 104(2).
33. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b) and (c) (1982); see also DRAFT CODE supra note 23, §
107.
34. Although the Crimes Code does not specifically define the term "felony" it does
provide: "A crime is a misdemeanor of the first degree if it is so designated in this title or if a
person convicted thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which
is not more than five years." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b)(6) (1982).
35. There is no mention in the Draft Code of any consideration of the collateral conse-
quences of the change. On March 13, 1987, this author spoke by telephone with Professor
Louis Schwartz, presently on the faculty at the law school of the University of California at
Hastings. Professor Schwartz had been a member of the drafting committee of the Draft
Code. He indicated that he had no recollections of any discussions by the drafting committee
of any wider aspects brought about by the changes in classifications other than those that
related directly to sentencing. He indicated that the committee's primary concern was to widen
the sentencing alternatives. The remarks by the chairman of the Senate Judiciary, Senator
Hill, on the floor of the Senate with regard to the Crimes Code bill bear this out. Senator Hill
stated:
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posed Code or the legislature86 to the effect these changes would
have beyond the Crimes Code. Yet, the result is dramatic.
Recall, for the sake of demonstration, the "hit and run" case
posed above in the introduction. The Pennsylvania Vehicles Code
makes it an offense for a driver of a vehicle to leave the scene of an
accident without stopping and identifying oneself and, if necessary,
rendering aid. Some of the statutes impose different obligations and
penalties depending on whether the vehicle or property damaged in
an accident was attended or unattended."a In another statute, a more
serious offense is established - leaving the scene of an accident in
which death or personal injury is caused. 8 This offense, however, is
graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree." Thus, while such an
offender could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment up to five
years, 0 he could not be arrested under Rule 101 since it is graded as
a misdemeanor and did not occur in the police officer's presence.
Apart from the "hit and run" offense, might some other under-
lying offense permit an arrest? For example, if the officer at the
scene was able to easily determine that the pedestrian was dead,
would homicide by vehicle4 permit an arrest under the Vehicle
Code? As long as the driver was not under the influence of alcohol
or a controlled substance, 2 the answer is no. Homicide by vehicle is
a misdemeanor of the first degree. Even a charge of involuntary
manslaughter under the Homicide section of the Crimes Code"3 is
only a misdemeanor of the first degree."
The main point that the bill does, Mr. President, is classify the crimes. To-
day we have penalties against particular crimes assessed at the time the bill
dealing with that crime is passed, and it is done without any reference to what
the prior law was, or sister-and-brother laws, shall we say, dealing with similar
offenses . . . . Now we have attempted to classify the crimes into seven
categories ....
In this way, Mr. President, it attempts to even out the disparity of the many
different offenses today for which there is no rhyme or reason for the various
penalties, because they were just passed as of that particular moment or when
that particular offense was made a crime, and they do not relate to each other.
This is a very bad feature of the present law ....
PA. SENATE JOURNAL 1633 (Sept. 12, 1972).
36. See PA. SENATE JOURNAL, 1633-1637; 1647; 1696-1698; 2022-2023 (Sept. 12, 13,
25 and Nov. 30, 1972).
37. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3743-45 (1984).
38. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3742 (1984) as amended 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. 135 (Purdon).
39. Only if leaving the scene itself materially contributes to the death of a person is the
offense a felony. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3742 (1984) as amended 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. 136
(Purdon).
40. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b)(8) (1982).
41. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732 (1984).
42. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3735 (1984).
43. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504 (1982).
44. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504(b) (1982). Additionally, the lesser offense of reckless
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This effect of a combined reading of the Crimes Code defini-
tions of felony and misdemeanor with the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure's law of arrest arises in a wide variety of instances beyond those
presented in the "hit and run" situation. The result in many in-
stances is that Pennsylvania law does not allow arrests when they
would be authorized by the laws of most other states4a and the
Model Penal Code.
An argument can be made that there is nothing wrong with this
result. It could be suggested that Pennsylvania is a very enlightened
and progressive state on the forefront of protecting its citizens from
being unnecessarily subjected to the indignities of an arrest when a
citation, summons, or warrant could be used against the offenders. In
some cases the present classification of offenses has the highly desir-
able effect of not permitting a person to be arrested without a war-
rant, thus protecting individual liberties. It does not matter that this
result comes only as an afterthought, rather than a pre-planned pol-
icy decision. On the other hand, there can be very serious problems
with an excessively restrictive arrest law." The merits of these argu-
ments could be debated if a policy regarding the limited power of
arrest were a consistent or even identifiable policy in the Common-
wealth. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to articulate a coherent
policy in Pennsylvania when the remainder of the law of arrest is
considered.
III. Where Otherwise Authorized By Law
The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two additional state-
ments about non-felony arrests in addition to the standard common
law rules. Rule 101 states:
Criminal proceedings in court cases shall be instituted by:
4. an arrest without a warrant upon probable cause when
driving would not be arrestable since it is only a summary offense. 75 PA. CONs. STAT. § 3714
(1984).
45. See the discussion of state definitions of felonies in MODEL PENAL CODE AND COM-
MENTARIES § 1.04 Comment n.8 (Proposed Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985).
Other states have departed from the Model Penal Code's one year dividing line between felo-
nies and misdemeanors, but none of these makes it higher than 2 years. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1-106 (1986) (2 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4206 (1983) (2 years); IowA CODE
ANN. § 903.1 (West Spec. Pamph. 1978) (2 years); 13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § I (1974) (2
years). Massachusetts once set the line at 2 years, but changed it to simply any offense
punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274 § I
(West 1970).
46. See McBroom, Enforcement of the Common Law Rules of Arrest: A Handcuffing of
Police? 6 DUQ. L. REV. 363 (1967-68).
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the offense is a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of
the police officer making the arrest, when such arrest without a
warrant is specifically authorized by statute. 7
In addition, Rule 51 similarly provides that:
Criminal proceedings in summary cases shall be instituted
...by:
(d) arresting without a warrant when arrest is specifically
authorized by law.
An initial problem exists for anyone trying to determine when such
"specifically authorized" arrests can take place. These grants of
power are not collected in any one place, but instead they are scat-
tered throughout the Crimes Code, the Vehicle Code, and elsewhere.
A. Specific Authorizations in Statutes
Special powers to arrest are granted to a wide variety of law
enforcement officers. For example, laws relating to fish and game, 49
probation and parole, 50 and a number of other areas contain special
provisions dealing with these matters.51 But as indicated, this Article
is concerned only with arrests by police officers. Thus, the search for
the arrest powers that come within the Rules of Criminal Procedure
as "specifically authorized" is confined to powers granted to police
officers. Furthermore, no special effort will be made to identify all of
the powers granted to police officers under such special legislation as
the fish and game law, the probation and parole laws, or the like.
Instead, a review will be undertaken of the law relating to arrests
arising in the ordinary enforcement of laws of more generalized ap-
plication. Beginning with those contained in the Crimes Code 2 and
the Vehicle Code, 53 research has disclosed the following "specifically
authorized" arrests.
47. PA. R. CRIM. P. 101. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
48. PA. R. CRIM. P. 51. This version of the rule has been in effect since 1985. Previously,
additional conditions had to be met for a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor to be valid.
These requirements were deleted in the changes. See discussion infra note 103 and accompa-
nying text.
49. See, e.g., 30 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901 (1980 & Supp. 1984); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 766
(Purdon 1962).
50. For a discussion regarding probation and parole violation arrests, see Common-
wealth v. Pincavitch, 206 Pa. Super. 539, 214 A.2d 280 (1965).
51. For example, see the discussion concerning constables in In re Borough High Con-
stables, 32 Del. 335 (Pa. Common Pleas 1914). See also 13 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 45 (Purdon
1967 & Supp. 1987).
52. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. 99 101-9183 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
53. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
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1. Crimes Code.-Section 2711 states that if a police officer
observes recent physical injury to a victim or other corroborative evi-
dence of domestic violence, he may arrest a spouse, or other person
with whom the victim resides or has formerly resided, for involun-
tary manslaughter, simple assault, aggravated assault, or recklessly
endangering another person.54 All of these would be misdemeanors,
but they are made arrestable offenses under this statute even though
they were not committed in the officer's presence. 5
Section 3904 grants a law enforcement officer the same right to
arrest without a warrant for any grade of theft as exists in the case
of the commission of a felony.5 Theft offenses can be graded as felo-
nies, misdemeanors, or summary offenses depending on factors such
as the value of the goods, the nature of the item taken, and the num-
ber of prior theft convictions."7
2. Vehicle Code.-Section 3731 authorizes a warrantless ar-
rest when the police officer has probable cause to believe the driver
was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, regard-
less of whether the offense occurred in his presence."'
Lastly, section 6304 provides:
Authority to arrest without warrant...(a) Pennsylvania State Police.-A member of the
Pennsylvania State Police who is in uniform may arrest
without a warrant any person who violates any provision
of this title in the presence of the police officer making
the arrest.
(b) Other police officers.-Any police officer who is
in uniform may arrest any nonresident who violates any
provision of this title in the presence of the police officer
making the arrest .. .
When these are viewed as the only four instances in the Crimes
Code and the Vehicle Code in which there has been a "specifically
54. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711 (Supp. 1986).
55. See also 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10190 (Purdon Supp. 1986), which deals with arrests
in Protection From Abuse Cases when there is an existing court order. In those cases there is
no need for corroborative evidence.
56. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3904 (1982).
57. There is also authorization for victims and police officers to detain for identification
or retrieval of goods in the Retail Theft statute 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3929(d) (1982), and the
Library Theft statute, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3929.1(d) (1982).
58. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
59. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304 (1984).
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authorized" grant of the power to arrest under the rules, it does not
seem to be a very substantial intrusion on individual liberties. More-
over, the power of a state to expand the authority to arrest for mis-
demeanors beyond that granted by the common law seems well es-
tablished. Justice White described a state's power in this area in
Welsh v. Wisconsin:60
[T]he [common law] requirement that a misdemeanor must
have occurred in the officer's presence to justify a warrantless
arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment, . . and we
have never held that a warrant is constitutionally required to
arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's pres-
ence. Thus, 'it is generally recognized today that the common
law authority to arrest without a warrant in misdemeanor cases
may be enlarged by statute, and this has been done in many of
the states.''
In addition, it would seem that each of the authorized situations
where warrantless arrests can be made under the Crimes Code and
the Vehicle Code could muster strong arguments for its necessity.
In the domestic violence provisions 62 of section 2711, timing is a
good reason not to require a warrant, especially when viewed in light
of the victim's need for protection. While section 3904's theft offense
authorization6" permits arrests for even the most petty of larcenies,64
it is reasonable not to have the validity of an arrest depend on fac-
tual matters that may be difficult to ascertain at the time of the
arrest, such as the value of the goods, or the number of times the
person has been convicted of a theft offense. 8
The Vehicle Code arrest authorizations can similarly be sup-
ported by rational argument. Without the grant of authority"0 in sec-
tion 3731, a police officer who did not personally witness the drunk
actually driving the car would be without authority to take effective
action.67 Similarly, section 6304, while perhaps being excessively
xenophobic with regard to the authority granted to municipal police
60. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
61. 466 U.S. at 756 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
62. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711 (Supp. 1986).
63. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3904 (1982).
64. See Wilgus, supra note 4 at 569; see also Waite, supra note 5 at 451.
65. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3903 (1982).
66. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
67. Problems can frequently arise after a driver is involved in an accident. Without the
authority granted by § 3731, police arriving on the scene who did not witness the person
driving could not make an arrest. Since they could not arrest, they could not even gather
further evidence of intoxication through breath, blood, or other tests.
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officers,68 can be seen as a rational means of dealing with the
problems that nonresidents present. The expansive authority of the
State Police is harder to defend on logical grounds and may be im-
possible to defend completely and consistently given constitutional
principles."
B. Generalized Authorizations in Statutes
As illustrated by the case of Commonwealth v. Neufer,70 "spe-
cifically authorized" grants of power for warrantless arrests are not
found only in the Crimes Code and the Vehicle Code. Local police
officers arrested Neufer for the summary offense of "pedestrian
under the influence of alcohol." The Vehicle Code provides: "A pe-
destrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any controlled sub-
stance to a degree which renders the pedestrian a hazard shall not
walk or be upon a highway except on a sidewalk."'7' The penalty
provision states that a person in violation "is guilty of a summary
offense and shall upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of
$5.,,72
Neufer was later charged with this offense and two other sum-
mary offenses - underage consumption of alcoholic beverages and
disorderly conduct.7 In addition, because of a search conducted inci-
dent to the arrest in which a small quantity of marijuana was discov-
ered, he was also charged with a misdemeanor drug count.7 ' The
trial court suppressed the evidence discovered during the search be-
cause it determined that the summary offense arrest was not a "spe-
cifically authorized" arrest and hence, was illegal."
The Commonwealth appealed this ruling, and the Superior
Court reversed. Framing the issues of admissibility in exactly the
same way that the trial court had, the court also concluded that
there was no specific authorization, as required by Rule 51, in the
68. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304 (1984).
69. See also 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 252 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1986), which grants
extensive powers to Pennsylvania State Police Officers. While the United States Supreme
Court seems willing to allow great latitude to the states under the fourth amendment to make
warrantless arrests in public for misdemeanors, see supra text accompanying note 61, some of
the discussion in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1980), which took into account the grav-
ity of the offense when it held unconstitutional a warrantless entry into a home, could be
argued to apply also to other warrantless arrests for very minor offenses.
70. 264 Pa. Super. 553, 400 A.2d 596 (1979).
71. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3550 (1984).
72. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3552 (1984).
73. 264 Pa. Super. at 555-56, 400 A.2d at 597.
74. Id. at 556, 400 A.2d at 597.
75. Id. at 557-58, 400 A.2d at 597.
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Crimes Code or Vehicle Code for the arrest of a pedestrian under
the influence of alcohol. 76 Nevertheless, the Superior Court con-
cluded that the arrest was valid 77 by finding the authority to arrest
elsewhere in the laws of Pennsylvania. Specifically, it found it in the
Municipal Corporations Law. 8
Pennsylvania has adopted a code which deals with most aspects
of municipal government for cities (subdivided into three classes),
townships (subdivided into two classes), and boroughs.7 9 Since the
police officers that arrested Neufer were officers of a police depart-
ment of a township of the second class, the court consulted the Sec-
ond Class Township Code.80 Among all of the other sections dealing
with boundaries, annexations, taxation and the other aspects of local
government, it discovered sections providing for the establishment of
police services, and defining police powers. The statute on which the
court relied as the basis for the lawful arrest in the Neufer case
provides:
Each policeman so appointed [under other provisions] shall be
an ex-officio constable of the township, and shall and may, with-
out warrant and upon view, arrest and commit for hearing any
and all persons guilty of breach of the peace, vagrancy, riotous
and disorderly conduct, or drunkenness, or who may be engaged
in the commission of any. unlawful act tending to imperil the
personal security or endanger the property of citizens, or in vio-
lating any of the ordinances of said township for which a fine or
penalty is imposed.8"
Comparable authority to that given to police officers in town-
ships of the second class can be found elsewhere in the Municipal
Corporations Code for police officers in cities of the first class82 and
third class,83 as well as in townships of the first class 84 and in bor-
76. Id. at 558-59, 400 A.2d at 599.
77. Briefly, the court constructed a complicated path by going through the Vehicle
Code's "specifically authorized" statutes in addition to those of the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure before it found the specific grant. It also discussed at great length how the police officers
would have been derelict in their duty if they had not made the arrests in this case. For some
unexplained reason the court seemed to indicate that this was important on the issue of the
arrest's lawfulness. While this might have been a way of addressing the "necessity" require-
ment of old Rule 51, infra note 108, the court did not identify it as such.
78. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-67605 (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1986).
79. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 101 (1972). Municipalities are classed based on their
population.
80. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 65101-67605 (Purdon 1972).
81. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 65591 (Purdon 1972).
82. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13349 (Purdon 1972).
83. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 37005 (Purdon 1972).
84. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56403 (Purdon 1972).
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oughs,86 but apparently not in cities of the second class.86 Or more
succinctly, such police authority exists in every municipality except
Pittsburgh.
87
One important feature should be noted about these statutes.
The arrests that are authorized by these statutes require that the
acts be committed "upon view," that is, in the officer's presence. 88
Thus, to the extent that these offenses could be characterized as be-
ing of the level or quality of a misdemeanor in the common law, an
arrest for them without a warrant would be defensible.89 Actually,
even this assertion requires considerable qualification.9" The prob-
lem, of course, is that most of the offenses mentioned in the statute
are not misdemeanors, but instead are summary offenses today. Here
again, the Pennsylvania grading of offenses departs from the more
generalized views regarding the grading of offenses.
As indicated earlier, the Model Penal Code set the dividing line
between a felony and a misdemeanor at one year, while Pennsylva-
nia's Crimes Code differs substantially."1 The next step for the
Model Penal Code was the creation of a category which it denomi-
nated as a "violation" as distinguished from a "crime." The explana-
tory note to the section on violations in the Model Penal Code indi-
cates that the section "creates a noncriminal class of offenses ...
for which only a fine or other civil penalty is authorized. It is envis-
aged that this class will primarily include regulatory offenses based
on strict liability and certain minor offenses such as traffic viola-
tions."'92 Pennsylvania departed from this idea in the creation of its
summary offense category. In addition to the imposition of fines,
many summary offenses are punishable by imprisonment for a term
of up to ninety days.9 While it is true that very minor offenses with
85. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 46121 (Purdon 1972). Similar powers are also conferred on
police officers of Second Class Counties (only Allegheny County). 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4501
(Purdon 1972).
86. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 65591 (Purdon 1972).
87. The City of Pittsburgh is the only city in the Commonwealth that is a city of the
second class.
88. The terms "on view" and "presence" are used interchangeably.
89. See cases cited supra note 1I.
90. In fact they may be considered "civil" penalties and, therefore, not within the com-
mon law rules. See Wilgus supra note 6, at 551, 577. It might also be necessary for these to
amount to a breach of the peace. Id. at 573.
91. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 3, § 1.04 Explanatory Note (1985).
93. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(c) (1982). The term "Summary Offense" was already
employed by Pennsylvania as a classification for minor offenses prior to the adoption of the
Crimes Code. It appears that this term was continued in the Crimes Code rather than the
Model Penal Code's "violation" because it was a familiar one. See DRAFT CODE supra note
25, § 107 Comment.
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very minor penalties (like the pedestrian under the influence offense
in Neufer) are most often the sort of offenses put into this category,
there are some surprising ones too. For instance, section 3733 of the
Vehicle Code provides that a driver who flees or attempts to elude a
pursuing police officer is guilty of only a summary offense.9 '
Although summary offenses are not crimes as defined under the
Crimes Code95 and arrests would not be permitted under common
law principles, the significance of this point to the present law of
arrest is probably irrelevant in practical terms since Rule 51 specifi-
cally recognizes the possibility of arrests in these cases. 6 Thus, ar-
rests for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence and
summary offenses committed in his presence fall into the same cate-
gory. Each requires that some "specifically authorized" provision be
located to authorize an arrest.
The difficulty generated by Neufer is the breadth of the author-
ity to arrest conferred by the statute construed in that case. The
statute ostensibly authorizes the arrest of individuals for a wide vari-
ety of matters, but many of these are not offenses at all. This raises
the question of whether a person can be arrested even though no
offense has been committed. For example, the statute authorizes an
arrest for vagrancy. Pennsylvania once had laws addressing vagrancy
that were later repealed. 97 But even when statutes dealt with va-
grants, they were poor laws and workhouse laws - quite emphati-
cally not criminal laws - which permitted such people to be put to
work (or sent from the state), but not imprisoned.98 Without at-
tempting to defend it, perhaps a statute authorizing the transporta-
tion of vagrants to workhouses (via hearings before justices of the
peace) through an arrest law made sense at one time. But what is its
significance today when the term "vagrancy" does not legally exist
except in a statute authorizing arrest for it? Similarly, there are no
offenses called "breach of the peace" 99 or "drunkenness.' '100
One of the broadest authorizations for a warrantless arrest con-
94. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3733 (1984) (punishable only by fine).
95. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b) (1982).
96. PA. R. CRIM. P. 51. The rule adds a layer of confusion by indicating that "criminal"
proceedings in "summary" cases can be brought in different ways.
97. Act of June 13, 1836, 1836 Pa. Laws 539, (formerly 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2032-41,
repealed Act of Dec. 6, 1972, 1972 Pa. Laws 1482).
98. Id.
99. But see infra text accompanying note 105.
100. These terms, could, of course, be analogized to disorderly conduct (but that was
already mentioned separately) or public intoxication that are summary offenses. Neufer used
the "drunkenness" provision to validate the warrantless arrest of a "pedestrian under the
influence."
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ferred by these statutes is the power to arrest for violations of munic-
ipal ordinances. Most municipalities have a wide array of ordinances
that cover all sorts of activity. Without any qualification of the
power granted by these arrest laws, it seems permissible for individu-
als to be arrested for very trifling offenses, like that of a homeowner
who didn't mow his lawn. 101 As far as can be determined Neufer is
the only appellate court case that has upheld the authority of an
arrest on the basis of these provisions of the Municipal Corporation
Law statutes.1
02
C. Breach of the Peace Authorizations
In addition to the grants of authority to make warrantless ar-
rests discussed in the preceding sections, authorization may also exist
in Pennsylvania to make an arrest whenever the offense amounts to a
"breach of the peace." The support for this authorization derives
from two different sources beyond the Municipal Corporations Law
discussed in the preceding section.
1. Breach of the Peace Under the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.-Earlier versions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure author-
ized an arrest without a warrant when:
... the offense is a summary offense which involves a
breach of the peace, or endangers property or the safety of any
person present provided the police officer making the arrest dis-
plays a badge or other symbol of authority or is in uniform.'
The authority to make an arrest under such a rule has been dis-
cussed in several cases.' 04 In general, the courts upheld the validity
of arrests under this rule when the offense that was charged itself
101. It is of interest to note that based on these statutes, an argument was once ad-
vanced that municipal police officers could only arrest for these offenses and could not arrest
for other crimes like murder. See Commonwealth v. England, 474 Pa. 1, 375 A.2d 1292
(1977). This argument was rejected. 474 Pa. at II, n.6, 375 A.2d at 1297, n.6. To prevent
recurrences of this sort of problem, the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act gives police author-
ity to "enforce the laws of the commonwealth." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8952 (1982). The act
deals with several police jurisdiction issues, especially those involved when police officers leave
their primary jurisdictions. The act does not address, let alone resolve the issues being dis-
cussed here in the text.
102. Several cases have discussed comparable municipal police power statutes. See
United States v. Crutchfield, 418 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Commonwealth v. Pin-
cavitch, 206 Pa. Super. 539, 214 A.2d 280 (1965).
103. PA. R. CRIM. P. 51(A)(5), 19 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1984) (in effect through
1975, but replaced in 1975 with the immediate predecessor of the present rule quoted infra at
note 110).
104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alford, 321 Pa. Super. 257, 467 A.2d 1351 (1983),
and cases cited therein.
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amounted to a breach of the peace. But when the offense that was
charged did not amount to a breach of the peace on its own terms,
the arrest was invalidated. For example, in Commonwealth v. Shil-
lingford,105 the Superior Court held that the warrantless arrest of a
minor for the summary offense of underage drinking was not lawful.
This result was reached even though the court indicated that the mi-
nor could have been lawfully arrested for public drunkenness. This
would have been valid, the court intimated, because the public intox-
ication offense10 6 contained an element of annoying others which
would have amounted to a breach of the peace. 10 7 In other words, it
seems that under the old rule the crime was assessed in the abstract
without regard to the facts of the case.
At various times, the courts have reviewed the different breach
of the peace authorizations for warrantless arrests that were pro-
vided for under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. They upheld ar-
rests that were made in compliance with those rules and voided those
that were not. The focus was always on the rule. But in 1975, the
rule was changed to the following:
The defendant may be arrested without a warrant by a po-
lice officer for a summary offense, but only when, (i) such arrest
is necessary in the judgment of the officer, and (ii) the officer is
in uniform or displays a badge or other sign of authority, and
(iii) such arrest is authorized by law .... 108
Two quick observations can be made about the effect of this
rule. First, the specific authorization for a "breach of the peace" ar-
rest was no longer in the rule. Second, subsection (i) seemed to place
limitations on "otherwise authorized" arrests by requiring some kind
of necessity for the arrest. The "necessity" requirement could be
seen as a limitation on the authority to arrest under other provisions
even when the power to arrest was specifically granted. The rule,
however, was changed again in 1986 to its present form that deletes
the "necessity" requirement. 0 9 At the same time, the new rule con-
tains no "breach of the peace" exception. Now, the only question is
whether the arrest is "specifically authorized." Thus, earlier cases
that found authority for breach of the peace arrests under prior ver-
sions of the rules are probably no longer valid since their underlying
105. 231 Pa. Super. 407, 332 A.2d 824 (1975).
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5505 (1982).
107. 231 Pa. Super. at 411 n.6, 332 A.2d at 824 n.6.
108. PA. R. CRIM .P. 51, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (rescinded 1986). (Discussed in Com-
monwealth v. Alford, 321 Pa. Super. 257, 467 A.2d 1351 (1983).)
109. PA. R. CRIM. P. 51.
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support has been withdrawn.
2. Breach of the Peace Arrests under the Common Law.-In
1983, after the changes in the rules described in the preceding sec-
tion, another warrantless summary offense arrest case came before
the Superior Court. In Commonwealth v. Alford,110 the court upheld
the arrest by citing the Shillingford case which had been decided
under the prior "breach of the peace" rule. The court dealt with the
changed rules by writing in a footnote:
Shillingford was decided under a prior version of the Criminal
Rules, which were revised in 1975. However, the official Com-
ment to those revisions states:
"[t]he 1975 amendment was not intended to
change the scope of an officers power of warrantless ar-
rest in summary cases, but to make it clear that such
arrest is permitted under the Rule only where such
power exists at common law or under the laws of the
General Assembly."
We also note that while no statutory grounds were asserted for
the officer's authority in this case, such power exists at common
law where a breach of the peace is involved.1 1'
The rule at the time of the Alford decision was the "necessity"
rule. It is possible, therefore, that the Comment quoted by the court
felt that the prior rule was covered by the "necessity" requirement.
The last paragraph of the footnote in Alford introduces an addi-
tional basis for breach of the peace arrests - Pennsylvania common
law. Commonwealth v. Doe" 2 was cited by Alford as authority for
this assertion. The entire discussion of this issue in the Doe case was:
Under the old English law in a case of affray, or any other
action, which would tend to be a breach of the peace, constables
are authorized to arrest, without warrant. Our law recognizes
the same right in them, and under our statutes they have the
right to seize gambling devices, or arrest, on view, persons vio-
lating certain provisions of the game and forest laws, and those
regarding the pollution of streams, etc.118
Each of the Doe court's examples was a distinct legislative grant.
110. 321 Pa. Super. 257, 467 A.2d 1351 (1983).
III. id. at 260 n.5, 467 A.2d at 1352-53 n.5.
112. Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 167 A. 241 (1933).
113. Id. at 189-90, 167 A.2d at 241-42.
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The court in Doe, therefore, might very well have been indicating
that the "our law" that recognized the lawfulness of a breach of the
peace arrest was our statutory law, not our judicial, common law.
Each of the Doe court's examples indicates a legislative authoriza-
tion. But, in Alford, the court seems to convert these breaches of the
peace into a broader common law application.
Consequently, although it may be tenuous, it can be argued that
a common law basis for a warrantless arrest for a breach of the
peace is currently available in Pennsylvania. Since a "breach of the
peace" might authorize a warrantless arrest, however, it becomes
necessary to define this phrase. Historically, the term arose centuries
ago in connection with arrests and the service of warrants on Sun-
day; the law permitted arrest and service of warrants on Sunday only
if the underlying offense was a treason, felony, or breach of the
peace.114 The definition of what amounted to a breach of the peace
was far from clear,115 and it is not much easier to state today. Per-
haps the best explanation for purposes of Pennsylvania law comes
from the case of Commonwealth v. Sherman."' After surveying the
meaning of "breach of the peace" at common law, the court con-
cluded as follows:
The more convincing authorities of our own state and many to
be found in other jurisdictions lead us to the conclusion that
• . . to constitute a breach of the peace there must be some act
of violence committed or threatened. Noise and disturbance,
though coming from a more or less large assemblage of persons,
must have given rise to some act of violence or must incite terror
or fear, or threaten or invite some act of violence to breach the
peace.
At least, we may go so far as to say that it is only such a breach
of the peace as we have described as will justify an officer in
making an arrest without a warrant .... 11
Central to the ideas expressed in Sherman are that the acts in-
volved must be violent in some way. Acts that are only disorderly,
disturbing, and annoying, however, are therefore, under this view,
not of a level that amounts to a breach of the peace." 8 But then,
114. See Wilgus, supra note 4, at 574.
115. Id.
116. 14 Pa. D. & C. 4 (1930).
117. Id. at 14.
118. See also Wilgus, supra note 4, at 573-76.
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perhaps one should take into account the ideas of breach of the
peace discussed in Shillingford, where it seems that the court's dis-
cussion concerning the validity of an arrest for public intoxication
would encompass more than the common law "breach of the peace"
violence notions by indicating that mere public annoyances might
qualify."1 9 However, the Shillingford case was decided under the old
version of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and could be argued to
apply only to them, not to the common law. The result is that the
common law breach of the peace exception is far from clear in either
its scope or even its present availability. This may bring the "breach
of the peace" exception right back to the Municipal Corporations
Law as its source. But the "breach of the peace" authorized there is
no easier to define.
IV. The Personal Identification Problem
One final problem must also be mentioned that is directly con-
nected to the law of arrest and can arise in a wide variety of situa-
tions. Suppose a person has committed a misdemeanor or a summary
offense for which an arrest is clearly not authorized. In such a situa-
tion, a police officer is expected to use a citation, summons, or a
warrant. But if the person refuses to identify himself to the police
officer, the officer would not know who to name in the process. At
the same time, however, as long as the person commits no other ar-
restable offense (or, to encompass the earlier discussion, is not
breaching the peace), there is no authority for taking such a person
into custody. Obviously, such a situation can substantially undermine
the enforcement process. Once more the "hit and run" example in
the introduction provides an illustration. What can be done when the
second police officer sees the automobile described by the radio
broadcast? It is probably lawful for the police officer to stop the ve-
hicle.' 21 He can probably check the car for any evidence of the colli-
sion.' 21 He can also ask the driver of the car for identification. 22 But
if the driver refuses to identify himself, so long as he does so quietly
without breaching the peace, how will the officer even know who to
119. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
120. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
121. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Of course, attempts to determine
whether the vehicle was stolen and, perhaps, who the owner was would be permissible. At the
same time, it would not be permissible to search either the interior of the vehicle or the driver,
except for weapons.
122. A driver is required to exhibit a driver's license to a police officer upon demand
under the Vehicle Code. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1511, 1571 (Purdon 1977). Violation of
this provision, however, is a summary offense.
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name in a citation, summons, or warrant? At present, there is no
way to deal with this situation under Pennsylvania law.' Without
some method of handling such a case in a lawful way, however, the
entire system of enforcement of non-arrestable offense cases is
jeopardized.
This situation could be dealt with in a number of ways. One
alternative would be to make the failure to identify oneself when
lawfully stopped an arrestable offense. 24 Another way would be to
allow police officers to detain such people until they are identified.
This approach could be analogized to civil contempt. Once detained,
as soon as a person identifies himself, he would be released. Thus, in
the same way that a person can purge himself in the contempt cases,
the detained person holds the keys to his freedom. 2 5 If either of
these alternatives is adopted, care must be taken to prevent the
power created from becoming an instrument of oppression. Never-
theless, in some fashion, attention must be given to the personal
identification problem because it is tied so closely to a system
designed to permit arrests for only the most serious offenses. It
should be stressed that this applies to both misdemeanors not com-
mitted in the officer's presence and summary offenses. Without some
mechanism to deal with the identification problem, prosecutions for
123. Perhaps arguments could be made that an officer in this situation could assume
that the car was stolen, thus making it an arrestable offense. See Commonwealth v. Woodard,
307 Pa. Super. 293, 453 A.2d 358 (1983); Commonwealth v. Bowser, 212 Pa. Super. 494, 243
A.2d 205 (1968). It would not seem that there would be probable cause to support this as-
sumption however. Alternatively, it could be argued that anyone who would not identify him-
self could be assumed to be a non-resident and therefore arrestable for Vehicle Code violations
under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304 (Purdon 1977); see supra text accompanying note 59. Lastly,
an argument might be suggested that the situation presents an exigent circumstance as in
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (ongoing fire); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); or Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (de-
struction of evidence). This argument might be quite weak, however, after Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740 (1984). In that case, although it concerned entry onto private property to make a
felony arrest, the Court stated:
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when arrests in
the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for
which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor . . . . When the gov-
ernment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, [the] presumption of
unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be al-
lowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a
neutral and detached magistrate.
466 U.S. at 750.
124. But see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (fourth amendment requires reasona-
ble suspicion of criminal activity in order for the stop to be deemed lawful); Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (statute must set forth with clarity what manner of identification
will satisfy its requirement in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness).
125. This might also be viewed as similar to the theft detainer authorizations. 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 3929(d), 3929.1(d) (1982).
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even relatively serious offenses may be thwarted.
V. Alternatives to the Present Law of Arrest
In the discussion above, a variety of different problems with re-
gard to the present state of the law of arrest in Pennsylvania came to
light. In some ways, each of the matters presented can be seen as
presenting a separate issue, but there also seems to be a larger prob-
lem involved in the relationship of all of these different provisions to
each other. Consequently, it seems appropriate to consider what the
alternatives to the present system might be and how they can be
brought about.
A. Permitting Arrests for More Serious Offenses
The example of the "hit and run" driver pointed out how the
present classification of offenses in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code
would prevent an arrest in that case. While there are strong argu-
ments against altering the present scheme if it is seen as an efficient
vehicle for limiting official intrusions in citizens, no position will be
taken on the merits of any of the arguments surrounding that issue.
Instead, the question to be addressed is how the present law can be
changed, and what some of the implications of a change might be.
1. Change the Crimes Code Classifications.-The principal
reason for a Pennsylvania arrest law more restrictive than those
found elsewhere is traceable to the Crimes Code classification of of-
fenses. 1 6 When the drafting committee altered the Model Penal
Code's sentencing schedule which was provided through the Model
Penal Code's classification of offenses, the evidence suggests that
they did so without being aware of the collateral effect this would
have on the law of arrest. 27 One simple way to broaden the arrest
law would be to reclassify as felonies all offenses that are presently
misdemeanors. The present array of available sentences could simply
be retained under the new classifcations. Thus, it would not be nec-
essary to alter the penalties attached to any offense, or for that mat-
ter, change the Crimes Code in any other way to have a significant
impact on the law of arrest.
The present misdemeanors of both the first and second degree
are punishable by more than two years imprisonment; therefore, they
are well above the generally accepted level of severity for determin-
126. See supra text accompanying note 29.
127. See supra note 35.
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ing whether a crime is a felony. Misdemeanors of the third degree
are right on the line.128 Nevertheless, it would almost certainly be
permissible to reclassify offenses in these categories as felonies if
that were desired.
It may nonetheless be suggested that the term "felony" should
be restricted to only the most serious offenses. Conviction for a fel-
ony has for centuries carried with it a connotation of extreme culpa-
bility and depth of blameworthiness. While only rarely do more sig-
nificant disabilities now attach to a felon than to a misdemeanant,I29
it still might be argued that this category should be reserved for only
the most heinous offenses.
2. Change the Rules of Criminal Procedure.-Another simple
way to transform the law of arrest into a broader grant of authority
is through a different statement of Rule 101. While the Rule is a
codification of the common law of arrest,18 0 because of the reclassifi-
cation of offenses that was undertaken in the Crimes Code, the terms
of Rule 101 do not have the same practical meaning in Pennsylvania
that they have in many other states.1"' It is not necessary for Penn-
sylvania to adhere to this form of the statement of the common law
rules. Given the present sentencing structure of the Crimes Code
with regard to misdemeanors, it would be completely permissible for
the rules to authorize a warrantless arrest for misdemeanors based
on probable cause without the presence requirement. This could be
accomplished by indicating the permissibility of arrests for "crimes"
which would include both felonies and misdemeanors, but not sum-
mary offenses. Indeed, this is exactly what some other states have
done. For example, New York's Criminal Procedure Law provides:
"a police officer may arrest a person for . . .[a] crime when he has
reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such
crime, whether in his presence or otherwise."' 32 In New York, the
term "crime" includes both felonies and misdemeanors,'3 3 as it does
under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 34
128. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
129. Some do still attach such as those effecting some professional licensures. See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 224 (Purdon Supp. 1986) (nurses); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.9A
(Purdon Supp. 1986) (accountants); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 123.1, 124.1 (Purdon Supp.
1986) (physicians).
130. See supra note 4.
131. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
132. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(I)(b) (McKinney 1981).
133. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1981).
134. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b) (Purdon 1983).
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B. Changes That Can Be Made to Prevent Arrests for Trivial
Incidents
There are several obvious ways in which the present law of ar-
rest could be put in order. First, more thoughtful judicial clarifica-
tion of the permissible scope of police authority in this area is essen-
tial. Closer attention is required to the question of when an arrest
can be made for a summary offense or other minor violation. This
question can not be adequately addressed through a common law
breach of the peace exception. Even if the meaning of this exception
were sufficiently clear, it is an inadequate basis for determining
when arrests should be made. Certainly, not all breaches of the
peace should be arrestable, nor should it be left to the individual
police officer's discretion without clearer guidance. Moreover, there
are some instances in which arrests should be authorized even in the
absence of a breach of the peace.
135
While the judiciary can provide better statements in this area, a
case involving these issues must be presented. Any attempt to pro-
vide a broad-based coherence can be extremely difficult if only a
fragment of the larger problem is presented in any particular case.
Also, this kind of judicial examination of these issues can only take
place after someone has already been arrested - perhaps for not
mowing his lawn.
Apart from the case by case approach, there is one other avenue
open to the judiciary. The Rules of Criminal Procedure can be
changed to avoid the open-ended "specifically authorized" language
of Rule 51. Express statements could clarify when arrests for sum-
mary offenses, violations of municipal ordinances, or other minor in-
fractions are authorized. In this regard, at least, the earlier rules had
considerable virtue.
Legislative solutions to the problems plaguing the present arrest
law would probably be more effective. One of these solutions might
be to consolidate all of the "specifically authorized" grants of the
power to arrest in one place, perhaps the Judicial Code. This would
be extremely cumbersome and would not solve the major problem
with this area of the law. The law of arrest in Pennsylvania is a
patchwork of statutes dating at least from 1876136 that may be both
outdated and in conflict with each other.
Probably the best solution would be a modern, comprehensive
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. This was the original date that the statute Neufer relied on was enacted.
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Arrest Code.1 87 The process of adopting a new arrest law would have
the advantage of permitting an open debate about the desirability of
allowing police officers to arrest for very minor infractions, such as
violations of municipal ordinances, while at the same time being de-
nied arrest power in relatively serious misdemeanor cases. This ap-
proach could also be used to deal with the felony/misdemeanor clas-
sification problem if that were deemed desirable.
VI. Conclusion
The significance of the lawfulness of an arrest is substantial for
several reasons. First and foremost is the direct illegality of the ar-
rest. Police officers should not exercise coercive power if they are not
authorized to do so, and citizens should not have to suffer the indig-
nities of unlawful police activity. Although a person who has been
unlawfully arrested can still be prosecuted for the offense, 1' 8 he is
nonetheless a victim of unlawful activity. Further, the police officer
in such a case could potentially be exposed to a civil damage suit.
Second, the derivative aspects of an arrest are often far more impor-
tant than the actual arrest itself. For instance, to the extent that a
search is conducted incident to an arrest and evidence is discovered,
the admissibility of the evidence may' 39 depend on the lawfulness of
the arrest. Whether this is evidence of the crime for which the per-
son was initially arrested or of a new and perhaps far more serious
offense, the arrest is central. Consequently, it is in everyone's interest
that the law of arrest be clear and understandable. Unfortunately,
neither quality is present in the current arrest law of Pennsylvania.
This Article has portrayed three different sets of problems that
presently exist in the law of arrest in this state. First, Pennsylvania
has restricted the authority of police officers to make warrantless ar-
rests for crimes not committed in their presence to a relatively nar-
row band of offenses. Second, police officers seem to possess an ex-
tremely broad authority to arrest for some offenses that are
committed in their presence, even when these offenses are of only the
most trivial sort, often not even crimes. Third, there exists an arcane
137. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Proposed Official Draft
1975).
138. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
139. Not all illegalities in an arrest will result in the operation of the exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Saul, 346 Pa. Super. 155, 499 A.2d 358 (1985) (arrest outside
primary jurisdiction by police officer in violation of Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act does not
demand that exclusionary rule be applied).
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system of law that demands that one travel a tortuous path in order
to determine the lawfulness of many of these arrests.
Whether police officers should be granted or denied the author-
ity to make arrests in the situations that have been presented re-
quires that judgments be made about the proper scope of arrest
power balanced against considerations of individual dignity and lib-
erty. The purpose of this Article was not to indicate the correctness
or desirability of any of the choices that are already implicitly ex-
pressed in the present law or to provide an agenda for law reform in
this area. Rather, the objective was to indicate that the present law
of arrest in this state implies certain policy choices but these
"choices" were not the product of reasoned debate. In many re-
spects, the law that purports to govern this area is in such a state of
organizational chaos that reliable predictions about the lawfulness of
many arrest powers are impossible to make.

